During the 1990s the world economy grew at a respectable gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 2.5 percent per year. However, intense debate continues to rage over the extent to which this economic growth has benefited poor people in the developing world. On the one hand, Dollar and Kray claim that "(since) average incomes of the poorest fifth of society rise proportionately with average incomes . . . (economic) growth generally does benefit the poor as much as everyone else (2001: 1, 32) . If this statement is true, then economic growth should be both necessary and sufficient to reduce poverty in the developing world. However, on the other hand, some observers argue that economic growth tends to increase income (and asset) inequality, and that these higher levels of inequality ensure that economic growth benefits the rich rather than the poor.
Forsyth, for example, writes that "there is plenty of evidence that current patterns of (economic) growth and globalization are widening income disparities and thus acting as a brake on poverty reduction " (2000: 6) . If this argument is correct, then the best way to reduce poverty would be to first tackle the considerable income and asset inequalities in the low-income countries of the world.
Deciding which of these arguments is correct is crucial to devising effective programs and policies for reducing poverty in the developing world. To date, many of the anti-poverty initiatives mounted by the major donor organizations of the world (World Bank, USAID, DFID) have focused more on promoting broad-based economic growth in developing countries, than on tackling differences in income and asset inequality in these countries. In order to understand how such a broad-based growth strategy might contribute to poverty reduction, it is essential to come to an understanding of how -and to what extent-economic growth is a necessary, if not sufficient, means for reducing poverty in the developing world.
The purpose of this paper is therefore to use empirical data to address the key question: "How does economic growth affect poverty and inequality in the low-income countries of the world?" The paper is organized as follows. Part 1 sets the stage by reviewing recent analytical arguments regarding the relationship between economic growth, poverty and income distribution. Part 2 then presents a new household data set, which contains detailed growth, poverty and inequality data for 50 low-and lower- 
The Debate about Economic Growth, Poverty and Income Distribution
In the past, some observers have argued that economic growth is not sufficient to reduce poverty in the developing world. For instance, in 1974 Chenery and others published an influential book in which they declared: "It is now clear that more than a decade of rapid growth in underdeveloped countries has been of little or no benefit to The most current thinking is that economic growth does not have much of an impact on inequality, because income distributions generally do not change much over time. According to Deininger and Squire (1996: 587) , gross domestic product (GDP) per capita increased by 26 percent in the developing world between 1985 and 1995, while Gini coefficients in the world changed by only 0.28 percentage points per year over the same period.
2 To cite a specific country example, in Taiwan Since income inequality tends to remain stable over time, economic growth can be expected to reduce poverty, at least to some extent. Exactly how much growth actually reduces poverty depends on at least two factors. The first is the rate of economic growth itself. Using an international poverty line of $1 per person per day, an econometric study by Squire (1993) regressed the rate of poverty reduction in a country against its rate of economic growth. His results show that a 1-percentage point increase in the growth rate reduced the poverty headcount ($1 per person per day) by 0.24 percentage points. A similar econometric study was done by Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998) . For 20 developing countries over the period 1984 to 1993, these three authors regressed the rate of change in the proportion of the population living on less than $1 per person per day against the rate of growth (change in survey mean income) and obtained a statistically significant regression coefficient of -2.12. This means that a 10-percentage point increase in growth (as measured by survey mean income) can be expected to produce a 21.2 percent decrease in the proportion of people living in poverty ($1 per person per day). The second factor affecting how much economic growth reduces poverty is the extent of inequality. In a straightforward statistical sense, economic growth can be expected to reduce poverty more if inequality falls, than if it does not. This expectation is confirmed by the previously cited study of Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998) . For the same 20 developing countries, these authors regressed the rate of change in poverty on both the change in growth (change in the survey mean) and the change in inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient). They obtained statistically significant coefficients of -2.28 for the growth variable and 3.86 for the inequality variable. In other words, even small changes in the overall distribution of inequality can lead to sizeable changes in the incidence of poverty. For any given rate of economic growth, the more that inequality falls, the greater is the reduction in poverty.
New Data Set on Growth, Poverty and Income Distribution
To test these relationships, and to more accurately pinpoint the impact of economic growth on poverty and inequality, it is necessary to construct a new empirical data set. This data set should do three things: first, it should focus on the low-income countries of the world; second, it should utilize the results of household budget surveys, since these surveys represent the best source of poverty information in most developing countries, and third, it should include complete growth, poverty and inequality for as many countries and time periods as possible.
Other observers have built such data sets to examine the impact of growth on poverty. Deininger and Squire (1996) , for example, constructed a comprehensive data base on income distribution for 58 countries. However, this data base included only 26 developing countries, and did not contain any specific poverty data. Ravallion and Chen (1997) , Chen and Ravallion (2000) and Ravallion (2001) , also constructed useful data sets that had growth, poverty and income distribution data. For example, the 1997 data set used by Chen and Ravallion (2000) included 42 developing countries.
The purpose of this study is to expand the coverage of previous work by including the results of those country-level household surveys which have become available since 1997. Initially, the goal was to include all 119 countries which were classified as either "low income" or "lower middle income" countries by the World Bank in the World Development Report, 2000/01. 3 However, it proved impossible to find poverty and inequality data for many of these 119 countries. Many of these countries had only one household survey, and some of the smaller population countries had no survey at all.
The present paper thus uses data from 50 "low income" and "lower middle income" countries; 4 all of these countries had at least two nationally-representative household surveys since 1980. The year 1980 was used as a cutoff point, because many of the pre-1980 household surveys were of suspect quality. Table 1 gives the countries, geographical regions, dates and welfare indicators included in the new data set. The data set is notable in that it includes 13 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, a region for which household survey data are relatively rare. It also includes countries from all other regions of the developing world, including 4 countries from East Asia, 12 from Europe and Central Asia, 10 from Latin America, 5 from South Asia and 6 from the Middle East and North Africa.
Since the goal is to examine how economic growth affects poverty and inequality, we need at least two surveys for each country. In the data set two surveys for one country define what is called an "interval." The data set includes a total of 101 intervals, which is considerably more than previous studies. 5 In constructing the intervals we use relatively restrictive criteria: intervals must be 2 or more years in length, they must come from nationally-representative surveys and they must use the same "welfare indicator" --either expenditure per person or income per person -over time. In measuring changes in poverty, Table 2 uses three different poverty measures.
The first, the headcount index, set at $1 per person per day, measures the percent of the population living beneath that poverty line in various survey years. However, the headcount index is a bit simple because it ignores the amounts by which the expenditures (income) of the poor fall short of the poverty line. For this reason, Table 2 To ensure comparability across countries, all of the poverty lines in Table 2 To measure changes in inequality, Table 2 uses the Gini coefficient. In the table this measure is normalized by household size and the distributions are weighted by household size so that a given quintile (such as the lowest quintile) has the same share of population as other quintiles across the sample.
In examining the impact of economic growth upon poverty and income distribution, the key question becomes: "growth of what?" "Growth" can be defined in various ways, and "We don't know, although it seems safe to say that there are almost certainly errors in both the (national accounts and the household survey figures). There is a longstanding prejudice by many economists against using surveys and in favor of (using) national accounts (to measure growth), (however) this is probably without basis" (2001: 133).
For the purposes of this study, we will use the unique approach of reporting results using both measures of growth. Most other growth and poverty studies typically only report results using growth as defined by changes in the survey mean. Ravallion and Chen (1997) as:
Where P is the measure of poverty in country i at time t, α i is a fixed effect reflecting time differences between countries in distribution, β is the "growth elasticity"
of poverty with respect to mean expenditure (or mean GDP) given by
* it
µ , γ is trend rate of change over time t, and ε it is a white-noise error term that includes errors in the poverty measure.
In equation (1) 
where ν it is a country-specific, time-varying error term that is assumed to be white noise.
However, when we use the household survey data, since the poverty measure (P) and mean consumption are derived from the same source, ν it is allowed to be contemporaneously correlated with ε it in equation (1). Using equation (2), equation (1) becomes:
Taking first differences, α i can be eliminated in order to obtain:
In equation (4) the rate of poverty reduction (P) is regressed on the rate of growth in mean consumption (or mean GDP). This is the basic equation that will be estimated here.
However, as Ravallion and Chen (1997) note, the difference transformation that is used to obtain equation (4) introduces a first difference in the original error term (ε it ). If the latter is white noise, then the new error process in equation (4) is correlated within countries and over time. This means that successive intervals for a given country are not statistically independent, because they have one household survey (or one national accounts) in common. Conventional methods of calculating standard errors then have to be modified to take account of the variance-covariance matrix of the error process ∆ε it .
In this study we correct all standard errors and t-ratios to take account of the error covariance of this specification. Table 2 shows that definite changes took place in the poverty and income distribution measures over the period 1980 to 1999. Poverty, when measured by the headcount index of $1.00 per person per day, declined in slightly over half (52 of 101) of the intervals in the data set. The poverty gap index also declined in slightly more than half (54 of 101) of the intervals. However, income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, increased in 55 of 101 intervals.
Main Findings of New Data Set
At the country level, some of the changes in poverty and inequality in Table 2 Table 3 provides a regional summary of how economic growth affects inequality.
Economic Growth and Income Distribution
For the data set as a whole, the two measures of growth suggest rather different rates of change. Economic growth, as measured by the survey mean, rose in 52 of the 101 intervals, but the average rate of change was slightly negative: -0.90 percent per year.
However, economic growth as measured by GDP per capita was much stronger: GDP per capita rose in 80 of the 101 intervals and increased at an average rate of 2.66 percent per annum.
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Whatever the correct rate of economic growth was, inequality rose in slightly more than half (55) of the intervals in the data set. However, the average annual rate of increase in the Gini coefficient was small: only 0.94 percent per year. Table 3 shows that economic growth was much more rapid in the lower middle income countries than in the low-income countries. This was a reflection of slow (and sometimes negative) growth in two regions of the world: Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. About half of the Eastern Europe and Central Asian countries are classified as "low income," and all of the Sub-Saharan countries fall into this category. The disappointing rates of economic growth in these two regions pulled down the averages for low-income countries as a whole.
Among the various regions of the world, Eastern Europe and Central Asia was
clearly the worst performer in terms of both growth and inequality. According to Table   3 , economic growth declined between 3.5 and 5.2 percent per year in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and inequality increased at a high average rate of 4.34 per annum. 11 This disappointing performance was caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union. After the Soviet Union folded, wage and income opportunities for millions of workers in the region declined dramatically, while returns to risk and entrepreneurship increased substantially for a select few. Because of these large changes in growth and inequality in Eastern
Europe and Central Asia, in the rest of this analysis we will distinguish changes in Eastern Europe and Central Asia from those in other regions of the world..
In Table 3 Figure 1 tries to broaden the examination of growth and inequality by plotting the changes in the (log) Gini coefficient against the changes in the (log) real survey mean income (consumption) for all countries in the data set. 12 If there was a strong tendency for economic growth to increase inequality, then most of the observations in Figure 1 would lie in the upper right quadrant (labeled "growth in mean with increasing inequality"). However, in reality, the observations in Figure 1 are distributed fairly equally among all four quadrants. In about 40 percent of the cases (21 of 52 intervals)
where there is growth in the (log) survey mean income (consumption), the (log) Gini coefficient actually declines and the observations lie in the lower right quadrant. This suggests that there is no strong correlation between economic growth (measured by the survey mean) and income distribution.
It is possible to further analyze the relationship between economic growth and inequality by using equation (4) to calculate elasticities of inequality with respect to growth. 13 The results are shown in Table 4 . At first glance, the results seem paradoxical.
Contrary to what the literature suggests, in the full sample economic growth -as measured by either the survey mean or GDP per capita -has a negative and significant effect on inequality. These same results are also obtained for low income and lower middle income countries. However, when the intervals from Eastern Europe and Central Asia are removed from the full sample, both of these effects vanish. 14 Moreover, when we add a regional dummy for Eastern Europe and Central Asia to the equations for low income and lower middle income countries (not shown), the negative and significant effect of growth on inequality also vanishes. On this basis, we conclude that when the results for Eastern Europe and Central Asia are excluded, economic growth has no statistical effect on income inequality. Outside of Eastern Europe and Central Asia, there is no systematic relationship between growth and inequality; inequality may increase, decrease or remain the same with economic growth. By contrast, South Asia and East Asia had impressive records of poverty reduction. Table 5 shows that poverty fell in both regions about 60 percent of the time: 9 of 15 intervals for South Asia and 13 of 18 intervals for East Asia. South Asia recorded a 1.65 annual average reduction in the proportion of people living on less than $1.00 per day: this was driven by high rates of poverty reduction in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan. East Asia did an even better job, by reducing its poverty headcount ratio by an average 7.01 percent per year. This impressive achievement was largely the result of two factors: first, China's decision to re-introduce capitalism into its economy, which had a dramatic effect on reducing levels of rural poverty in that country; and second, Thailand's continuing economic "miracle," which reduced to zero the number of people living on less than $1.00 per day. It is possible to test this relationship by using equation (4) to estimate elasticities of poverty with respect to growth. The results are shown in Table 6 (a) and (b). Three sets of findings are noteworthy. First, measuring growth by the survey mean, Table 6 (a)
Economic Growth and Poverty
shows that virtually all of the regression coefficients for the three types of poverty measures -headcount, poverty gap and squared poverty gap --are negative and highly significant at the 1 percent level. When growth is measured by GDP per capita (Table 6 (b)), far fewer of the poverty coefficients (6 of 12 coefficients) are significant and only three of them are significant at the 1 percent level. These differing results suggest that when growth is measured by the survey mean, economic growth does reduce poverty;
however, when growth is measured by GDP per capita, the statistical relationship between growth and poverty is less clear. Second, when growth is measured by the survey mean, the point estimate for the growth elasticity of poverty for the headcount ratio for the full sample is quite high (-5.745 ). This high point estimate is probably due to the inclusion of so many intervals from the countries of Europe and Central Asia. 16 In fact, when the intervals from Europe and Central Asia are excluded, the point estimate for the headcount ratio becomes -2.592, which is very close to the one estimated (-2.12) by Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998) on a smaller set of countries. In other words, when the countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia are excluded, a 10-percentage point increase in growth (measured by the survey mean) in this data set can be expected to produce a 25.9 percent decrease in the proportion of people living in poverty ($1 per person per day). Third, when growth is measured by the survey mean, the data show that growth has a greater impact on the more sensitive measures of poverty. In Table 6 (a) the growth elasticities for both the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap measure are higher than that for the simple headcount ratio. While a 10-percentage point increase in growth can be expected to lead to a 25.9 percent decline in the headcount index, it will lead to a 30.4 percent fall in the poverty gap and a 33.9 percent decrease in the squared poverty gap. When growth is measured by the survey mean, the data clearly show that growth reduces poverty faster for more sensitive poverty measures.
Since Eastern Europe and Central Asia had such a poor poverty record, it is useful to see if the preceding results are robust when data from this region are excluded from low income and lower middle income countries. Measuring growth by the survey mean, Table 7 (a) shows that virtually all of the regression coefficients for the three types of poverty measures are negative and highly significant. When growth is measured by the survey mean, the point estimate for the headcount ratio of poverty for the full sample (-2.592) is very close to those estimated for low income (-2.523) and lower middle income countries (-2.752). Finally, as in the preceding table, when growth is measured by the survey mean, the growth elasticities for both the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap measure are higher than that for the simple headcount ratio. When growth is measured by the survey mean, the data show that economic growth reduces poverty faster for more sensitive poverty measures.
It should be emphasized that all of these estimated growth elasticities are averages. In other words, there is considerable variation between countries and over time in the extent to which poverty responds to economic growth. As noted by Ravallion (1997) , one of the more important factors affecting how poverty responds to growth is the level of initial inequality in a country. The impact of this variable on poverty can be examined by dividing the full sample into two groups of countries -low-income inequality countries (initial Gini below 40.0) and high-income inequality countries (initial Gini above 40.0) -and re-estimating the regressions in Table 6a using survey mean income (consumption). The results for the poverty headcount measure show that countries with a low initial Gini have a growth elasticity of poverty between -5.672 (t-ratio of -3.42) and -6.077 (t = -4.48), while those with a high initial Gini have a much lower growth elasticity of poverty, between -2.438 (t = -1.46) and -3.272
(t = -3.48). In other words, with a given rate of economic growth, low inequality countries will be about twice as effective in reducing the proportion of people living in poverty ($1 per person per day) than high inequality countries.
Conclusion
This paper has analyzed a new household data set to address the key question:
"To what extent does economic growth reduce poverty in the low-income countries of the world?" The basic finding is that economic growth represents an important means for reducing poverty in the developing world. This finding is robust for the two definitions of growth used in this study. When economic growth is measured by survey mean income (consumption), there is a strong, statistical link between growth and poverty reduction. When economic growth is measured by GDP per capita, the statistical relationship between growth and poverty reduction is still present, albeit not quite as strong.
Why is economic growth so important in reducing poverty? The answer to this question has been broached at several points in this analysis. Economic growth reduces poverty because first and foremost growth has little impact on income inequality. Income distributions do not generally change much over time. Analysis of the 50 countries and the 101 intervals included in the data set shows that income inequality rises on average less than 1.0 percent per year. Moreover, econometric analysis shows that economic growth has no statistical effect on income distribution: inequality may rise, fall or remain steady with growth.
Since income distributions are relatively stable over time, economic growth -in the sense of rising incomes -has the general effect of raising incomes for all members of society, including the poor. As noted above, in many developing countries poverty, as measured by the $1 per person per day standard, tends to be "shallow" in the sense that many people are clustered right below (and above) the poverty line. Thus, even a modest rate of economic growth has the effect of "lifting" people out of poverty. Poor people are capable of using economic growth -especially labor-intensive economic growth which provides more jobs --to "work" themselves out of poverty. Table 8 underscores these relationships by summarizing the results of recent empirical studies regarding the growth elasticity of poverty. When growth is measured by survey mean income (consumption), the point estimates of the elasticity of poverty with respect to growth are remarkably uniform: from a low of -2.12 in Bruno, Ravallion and Squire (1998) , to a mid-range of -2.59 in this study (excluding Eastern Europe and Central Asia), to a high of -3.12 in Ravallion and Chen (1997) . In other words, on average, a 10-percentage point increase in economic growth (measured by the survey mean) can be expected to produce between a 21.2 and 31.2 percent decrease in the proportion of people living in poverty ($1 per person per day). Economic growth reduces poverty in the developing countries of the world because average incomes of the poor tend to rise proportionately with those of the rest of the population.
The fact that economic growth is so critical in reducing poverty highlights the need to accelerate economic growth throughout the developing world. Present rates of economic growth in the developing world are simply too low to make a meaningful dent in poverty. As measured by per capita GDP, the average rate of growth for the 50 low income and lower middle income countries in this paper was 2.66 percent per year. As measured by mean survey income (consumption), the average rate of growth in these 50 countries was even lower: a slightly negative -0.90 percent per year (Table 3 ). In the future, these rates of economic growth need to be significantly increased. In particular, more work needs to be done on identifying the elements used for achieving successful high rates of economic growth and poverty reduction in certain regions of the developing world (e.g., East Asia and South Asia), and applying the lessons of this work to the continuing growth and poverty needs in other areas, such as Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
Notes
1 For a useful review of these studies, see Fields (2001: 40-48 ).
2 The Gini coefficient is a standard measure of inequality which is scaled to lie between 0 (perfect equality) and 100 (perfect inequality).
3 The full list of these 119 countries appears in World Bank, World Development Report (2001: 334). 4 Of the 50 countries included in the data set, 23 are classified by the World Bank as low income and 27 are classified as lower middle income. 1989 , 1992 , 1994 , 1996 Income India South Asia Low 1983 , 1986 , 1988 , 1990 , 1995 , 1997 Expenditure Indonesia East Asia Low 1987 , 1993 , 1996 Expenditure Jamaica Latin America Lower middle 1988 , 1990 , 1993 , 1996 Notes: Estimates were obtained using ordinary least squares, regressing the difference between household surveys in the log of the Gini coefficient of inequality on two variables: (1) the time elapsed between the surveys; and (2) the difference in the log of the real value of the survey mean income/consumption (or GDP per capita). T-ratios are shown in parentheses, corrected for heteroscedasticity. Sample sizes are 42 intervals for low income countries, 59 intervals for lower middle income countries, 101 intervals for full sample, and 78 intervals for full sample, excluding Eastern Europe and Central Asia. See Table 1 for countries and survey dates. *Significant at the 0.05 level. **Significant at the 0.01 level. (-6 .90)** __________________________________________________________________________________ Notes: Estimates were obtained using ordinary least squares, regressing the difference between household surveys in the log of the poverty measure on two variables: (1) the time elapsed between the surveys; and (b) the difference in the log of the real value of survey mean income (consumption). T-ratios are shown in parentheses, corrected for heteroscedasticity. Sample sizes are 42 intervals for low income countries, 59 intervals for lower middle income countries, (1.01) (-2.02)* __________________________________________________________________________________ Notes: Estimates were obtained using ordinary least squares, regressing the difference between household surveys in the log of the poverty measure on two variables: (1) the time elapsed between the surveys; and (2) the difference in the log of the real value of GDP per capita, 1993 PPP values. T-ratios are shown in parentheses, corrected for heteroscedascity. Sample sizes are 42 intervals for low income countries, 59 intervals for lower middle income countries, 101 intervals for full sample, and 78 for full sample, excluding Eastern Europe and Central Asia. See Table 1 for countries and survey dates. *Significant at the 0.05 level. **Significant at the 0.01 level. (-6 .90)** __________________________________________________________________________________ Notes: Estimates were obtained using ordinary least squares, regressing the difference between household surveys in the log of the poverty measure on two variables: (1) the time elapsed between the surveys; and (b) the difference in the log of the real value of survey mean income (consumption). T-ratios are shown in parentheses, corrected for heteroscedasticity. Sample sizes (excluding Eastern Europe and Central Asia) are 35 intervals for low income countries, 43 intervals for lower middle income countries and 78 intervals for full sample. See Table 1 for countries and survey dates. *Significant at the 0.05 level. **Significant at the 0.01 level. (1.01) (-2.02) __________________________________________________________________________________ Notes: Estimates were obtained using ordinary least squares, regressing the difference between household surveys in the log of the poverty measure on two variables: (1) the time elapsed between the surveys; and (2) the difference in the log of the real value of GDP per capita, 1993 PPP values. T-ratios are shown in parentheses, corrected for heteroscedascity. Sample sizes (excluding Eastern Europe and Central Asia) are 35 intervals for low income countries, 43 intervals for lower middle income countries and 78 intervals for full sample. See Table 1 for countries and survey dates. *Significant at the 0.05 level. **Significant at the 0.01 level. Change in log Survey Mean (x100) Change in log poverty rate ($1/day) (x100) Growth in mean with increasing poverty Decreasing mean with increasing poverty Decreasing mean with falling poverty Growth in mean with falling poverty
